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Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada
Violence: A Markov Process Approach
Ivan Jeliazkov and Dale J. Poiriery
Abstract. This paper analyzes the daily incidence of violence during the Second
Intifada. We compare several alternative statistical models with dierent dynamic
and structural stability characteristics while keeping modelling complexity to a
minimum by only maintaining the assumption that the process under consideration
is at most a second order discrete Markov process. For the pooled data, the best
model is one with asymmetric dynamics, where one Israeli and two Palestinian
lags determine the conditional probability of violence. However, when we allow
for structural change, the evidence strongly favors the hypothesis of structural
instability across political regime sub-periods, within which dynamics are generally
weak.
Keywords: Bayesian, conjugate prior, Israeli-Palestinian conict, marginal likeli-
hood.
1 Introduction
The second Intifada, which is the latest episode in the Israeli-Palestinian conict, began
on September 29, 2000, following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount the day
before. The violence quickly escalated and by the end of May 2007 a total of 5170
people (1023 Israelis and 4147 Palestinians) had lost their lives. These deaths occurred
on 1366 (approximately 56%) of the 2436 total days during that period. Unfortunately,
the casualties on both sides have overwhelmingly been civilian. Figure 1 shows the
incidence of violence on both sides over the period September 29, 2000{May 31, 2007.
Concerns that Israel and the Palestinians were becoming involved in a spiraling
cycle of violence and retaliation led to a wide international eort to put an end to the
bloodshed. Diplomatic eorts included proposals by the Quartet (US, EU, UN, and
Russia) and a number of summits and rounds of negotiation in Egypt, Jordan, and
elsewhere. The results (the Mitchell Report, Tenet Plan, the Road Map, the Geneva
Accord of 2003, etc.) were unanimous in recommending disengagement, either gradual
or immediate, as a rst step towards peace negotiations. The notion that a cycle of
violence exists and feeds on itself motivates the rst main goal of this paper, namely to
examine the importance of conict dynamics and whether the data are consistent with
persistent and retaliatory (\tit-for-tat") behavior.
The evolution of the Second Intifada and the historical events leading to it, against
the backdrop of the wider Arab-Israeli conict, have been well summarized in
Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven (2006) and Milton-Edwards and Hinchclie (2004), and
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Sub-Period Description
1. Oct 1, 2000{Feb 6, 2001 Barak period; Sharon elected Prime Minister
2. Feb 7, 2001{Feb 28, 2002 Sharon period before extreme violence
3. Mar 1, 2002{Apr 30, 2002 Extreme violence; operation \Defensive Shield"
4. May 1, 2002{Jun 30, 2003 Post extreme violence; Palestinian cease-re
5. Jul 1, 2003{Nov 11, 2004 Post Palestinian cease-re; Arafat dies
6. Nov 12, 2004{Jan 4, 2006 Post Arafat; Sharon's second stroke
7. Jan 5, 2006{Jul 11, 2006 Olmert, Hamas governments; pre-Lebanon War
8. Jul 12, 2006{Aug 14, 2006 Lebanon War
9. Aug 15, 2006{Nov 25, 2006 Post-Lebanon War
10. Nov 26, 2006{May 31,2007 Abbas and Olmert sign Israeli-Palestinian truce
Table 1: Sub-periods of interest during the Second Intifada.
news summaries of the conict appear regularly in the media. Against this background,
several facts about the Second Intifada can be noted. Importantly, the Second Intifada,
unlike the First Intifada of 1987-1990, has been a much more violent and prolonged
conict (the First Intifada claimed the lives of approximately 1,162 Palestinians and
160 Israelis). In addition, during the course of the Second Intifada, both sides experi-
enced changes in policies and political leadership on several occasions. These political
sub-periods are given in Table 1.
Because of the length of the conict and the dierences in political regimes, it is less
likely that the same dynamic process applies throughout. Indeed, a casual inspection
of Figure 1 shows that the incidence of violence during the Second Intifada was not
uniformly distributed, with several periods of exacerbated violence and relative calm
intermingled with each other. These considerations motivate the second main goal of
this paper { to formally determine the importance of these particular policy changes on
the occurrence of violence during the Second Intifada.
We approach these two main objectives by considering a number of models with
dierent dynamic and structural characteristics. By formally comparing these models,
we can get a sense of the relative weights that time series behavior on the one hand,
and political change on the other, have in determining the incidence of violence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the statistical
model and the framework for model comparison and predictive analysis in this context.
Section 3 discusses the data used in the study. Section 4 presents our main results,
while Section 5 concludes.
2 Statistical Framework
The occurrence of violence on day t (t = 1;:::;T) is captured by two binary indicator
variables, It and Pt, where It = 1 if any Israeli deaths occur on day t (It = 0 otherwise),Jeliazkov and Poirier 65
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Figure 1: Weekly fraction of violent days during the Second Intifada.
and similarly, Pt = 1 if any Palestinian deaths occur on day t (Pt = 0 otherwise).
Therefore, on day t we observe the variable yt = (It;Pt), which can take one of four
possible realizations: yt = (0;0) (a peaceful day), yt = (1;1) (a violent day), yt = (1;0)
and yt = (0;1) (mixed days). We postulate (at most) a second order Markov structure
for yt on each day conditional on the outcomes on (at most) the two preceding days.
Given a second order Markov structure for yt, there are 16 possible data congurations
of yt 1 and yt 2 for the preceding two days. The second order Markov process structure
implies that the outcome yt is related to the conditioning variables (yt 1;yt 2) through
the transition matrix  =

ijjklmn

164, where the rows correspond to the possible
values of (yt 1;yt 2), the columns correspond to the possible outcomes for yt, and the
respective entries
ijjklmn = Pr(yt = (i;j)jyt 1 = (k;l)yt 2 = (m;n)); ijjklmn 2 ;
give the transition probability of the trajectory
(yt 1 = (k;l);yt 2 = (m;n)) ! (yt = (i;j));
for i;j;k;l;m;n 2 f0;1g. In the preceding, the parameter space  consists of non-
negative numbers which must sum up to 1 for each row of , i.e. since ijjklmn are
probabilities, they must satisfy 0  ijjklmn  1 and 00jklmn + 10jklmn + 01jklmn +
11jklmn = 1 for each of the trajectories. The Markovian structure is thus a useful
conceptualization for our data, which can alternatively be viewed nonparametrically as
consisting of three-day strings taking on one of 64 possible congurations.66 Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada Violence
Upon letting y = (y1;:::;yT) denote all the data, the likelihood function factors as a
product of multinomial likelihood contributions
L(;y) =
Y
k;l;m;n2f0;1g
Y
i;j2f0;1g

Tijjklmn
ijjklmn ; (1)
where Tijjklmn denotes the number of days in the sample corresponding to the string
(yt = (i;j);yt 1 = (k;l);yt 2 = (m;n)). Further, let
klmn =

00jklmn;10jklmn;01jklmn;11jklmn

denote the elements in row klmn of  and let Tklmn =
P
i;j2f0;1g Tijjklmn be the total
number of days in the sample for which (yt 1 = (k;l);yt 2 = (m;n)).
A convenient family of conjugate priors for  is a product of independent Dirichlet
densities, one for each klmn:
p() =
Y
k;l;m;n2f0;1g
D

klmnj
klmn;klmn

(2)
where the Dirichlet density is given by
D

klmnj
klmn;klmn

=
2
4  (klmn)
Q
i;j2f0;1g  

klmn
ijjklmn

3
5
Y
i;j2f0;1g

klmn
ijjklmn 1
ijjklmn
In (2), the preassigned hyperparameter vectors

klmn = [
00jklmn;
10jklmn;
01jklmn;
11jklmn]0
of positive quantities satisfy
P
i;j2f0;1g 
ijjklmn = 1 and klmn > 0 is a scalar controlling
the tightness of the prior beliefs around 
klmn. Loosely speaking, klmn is the sample
size of a ctitious sample yielding the sample proportion 
klmn. From the properties of
the Dirichlet distribution, we know that the mean of klmn is 
klmn and the variances
and covariances are
V ar(ijjklmnj
klmn;klmn) =

ijjklmn

1   
ijjklmn

1 + klmn
(3)
and
Cov(ijjklmn;qrjklmnj
klmn;klmn) =  

ijjklmn
qrjklmn
1 + klmn
: (4)
In addition, marginal and conditional distributions are also Dirichlet.
Given 
klmn and klmn, the prior density in (2) combines easily with the likelihoodJeliazkov and Poirier 67
in (1) using Bayes' Theorem to produce the posterior density
p(jy) =
Y
k;l;m;n2f0;1g
D(klmnjklmn;klmn); (5)
which is also a product of independent Dirichlet densities, where
klmn = klmn + Tklmn;
ijjklmn =
klmn
ijjklmn + Tklmn
klmn
=

1  
klmn
klmn

Tijjklmn
Tklmn
+

klmn
klmn


ijjklmn; (6)
klmn =
h
00jklmn;10jklmn;01jklmn;11jklmn
i0
:
Because of the prior independence in (5), the posterior analysis breaks into 16 inde-
pendent analyses, one for each row of . The posterior mean in (6) is a convex com-
bination of the prior mean and the sample proportion Tijjklmn=Tklmn (the maximum
likelihood estimate). Posterior variances and covariances of klmn are similar to (3){(4)
with 
ijjklmn and klmn replaced by ijjklmn and klmn. Additional features of the
distributions used here, as well as general discussion of the use of conjugate priors in
Bayesian analysis, can be found in standard textbooks such as Zellner (1971), Poirier
(1995), and Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin (2003). Important early work on the es-
timation of multinomial probabilities in contingency tables includes Good (1965) and
Fienberg and Holland (1973).
Before proceeding, we mention that the model presented above is fairly simple, but
nonetheless appropriate for this setting. Similar models have been used in many elds of
science including climatology and meteorology (e.g. Harrison and Waylen 2000), ecology
and biology (e.g. Wootton 2001), and the health sciences (e.g. Sonnenberg and Beck
1993). We have conned our attention to this structure for two basic reasons. First,
the main benet of this model is that it is very clear. Its parameters are directly
interpretable and unambiguous, which is an important consideration when one is trying
to uncover basic features of the data in a case study. The second reason is that dynamic
simplicity appeared to be favored by the model comparison framework to which we turn
attention next.
2.1 Model Comparison and Prediction
In the context of the Second Intifada, our objectives are to (i) explore the dynamic
characteristics of the process generating the violence and (ii) explore the stability of the
process of violence across political sub-periods. These two issues are formally addressed
by comparing several alternative models incorporating dierent dynamic and structural
characteristics, through their marginal likelihoods and Bayes factors (Jereys 1961;
Kass and Raftery 1995). In particular, for any two competing models Mi and Mj,68 Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada Violence
upon using Bayes' theorem, the posterior odds can be written as
p(Mijy)
p(Mjjy)
=
p(Mi)
p(Mi)

p(yjMi)
p(yjMj)
; (7)
where the rst fraction on the right hand side is known as the prior odds, and the
second is called the Bayes factor. The Bayes factor, in turn, is the ratio of the marginal
likelihoods under the two models, where
p(yjMl) =
Z

L(;y;Ml)p(jMl)d; (8)
and where the prior distribution and likelihood function now explicitly involve condition-
ing on the model indicator Ml to underscore the dependence of  on Ml. Importantly,
because of the tractability of the posterior distribution in our setting, the marginal
likelihoods are available analytically as
p(yjMl) =
p(jMl)L(;y;Ml)
p(jy;Ml)
=
Y
k;l;m;n2f0;1g
 (klmn)
Q
i;j2f0;1g
 

klmnijjklmn

 (klmn)
Q
i;j2f0;1g
 

klmn
ijjklmn
:
The marginal likelihoods obtained in this way can be used to assess the posterior odds
in (7), or given a set of models fM1;:::;MLg under consideration, one can use the
model probabilities p(Mijy) for model averaging in predictive inference.
Two additional issues deserve emphasis in this setting. The rst is that when com-
paring alternative models, the quantities in (7) and (8) should be computed using the
same data y. This is particularly important when considering models with dierent
dynamics and numbers of lags. Since in our application the largest model contains two
lags, the rst two days of the Intifada, September 29-30, 2000, are used as initial ob-
servations upon which all further analysis is conditioned; the eective sample therefore
begins with October 1, 2000 (t = 1) and continues through May 31, 2007 (T = 2434).
We use the same eective sample even for models with simpler dynamics (one lag or no
lags) because the models being compared should be t on the same data. The second
issue is that when y is broken up into, say, J periods y = (y1;:::;yJ), and within each
period we allow for a dierent set of parameters so that  = (1;:::;J), each one inde-
pendent of the other periods (so that p(jMl) = p(1jMl)p(JjMl)), the marginal
likelihood becomes the product of the sub-period marginal likelihoods
p(yjMl) =
Z
L(1;y1;Ml)L(J;yJ;Ml)p(1jMl)p(JjMl)d1 dJ
=
J Y
j=1
Z
L(j;yj;Ml)p(jjMl)dj:
Equivalently, on the log scale lnp(yjMl) =
PJ
j=1 lnp(yjjMl).Jeliazkov and Poirier 69
Finally, the one-day ahead posterior predictive mass function for yT+1 given yT and
yT 1 is
Pijjklmn = Pr(yT+1 = (i;j)jyT = (k;l);yT 1 = (m;n))
=
Z 1
0
ijjklmnp
 
ijjklmnjy

dijjklmn = klmn;
which is the posterior mean. Hence, appropriate credibility bands for this prediction
are given by (3) with 
klmn replaced by klmn and klmn replaced by klmn.
3 Data
We have compiled an up-to-date data set on the Second Intifada from www.btselem.org,
an Israeli human rights organization that is well respected by both sides in the conict,
as well as by international organizations. From the last line of Table 2 it is seen that
out of the 2434 observations between October 1, 2000 and May 31, 2007, 1070 (44%)
correspond to peaceful days with no fatalities, 100 (4:1%) correspond to days with Israeli
fatalities but no Palestinian fatalities, 1034 (42:4%) correspond to days with no Israeli
fatalities but with Palestinian fatalities, and 230 (9:5%) correspond to violent days with
both Israeli and Palestinian fatalities.
To assess temporal dependence, Table 2 also provides the number of transitions of
the Markov process. The most common pattern (376 or 15:4% of the 2434 observations)
corresponds to three consecutive days with no fatalities on either side. The next most
common three-day pattern (261 or 10:7%) corresponds to three consecutive days with
no Israeli fatalities but some Palestinian fatalities on all three days. The most common
run-up to the violent days when both groups suered fatalities was two days in which
no Israeli fatalities occurred but Palestinian fatalities occurred (48 or 20:9% of the 230
days with violence on both sides). Four of the possible 64 transitions never occurred in
the sample. Finally, note that the numbers in Table 2 are sucient statistics, in that
they are all that is required to construct the likelihood function.
4 Analysis
4.1 Choice of Priors
The posterior independence in (5) is quite useful as it aides interpretability and simplies
the analysis. However, it comes at a price: the need to elicit priors on the rows of .
In the two-lag Markov model  has 16 rows, which implies that 16 vectors 
klmn and
16 scalars klmn should be determined in order to dene the prior distributions. In
this paper, we assign common values ijjklmn = 0:25 for the hyperparameters across
(i;j;k;l;m;n), implying that transitions are a priori equiprobable and do not favor any
of the alternative outcomes. This is an important baseline case that is likely to appeal
to a wide readership because of its neutrality on issues such as revenge, preemption,70 Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada Violence
Number of transitions from (yt 1;yt 2) to yt
(yt 1;yt 2) yt = (0;0) yt = (1;0) yt = (0;1) yt = (1;1)
(0;0;0;0) 376 17 177 26
(0;0;1;0) 19 2 14 3
(0;0;0;1) 175 22 157 27
(0;0;1;1) 26 3 15 10
(1;0;0;0) 19 4 17 4
(1;0;1;0) 3 0 2 0
(1;0;0;1) 12 1 21 6
(1;0;1;1) 4 0 3 4
(0;1;0;0) 155 10 170 28
(0;1;1;0) 16 4 20 3
(0;1;0;1) 180 24 261 48
(0;1;1;1) 31 2 62 21
(1;1;0;0) 28 5 26 7
(1;1;1;0) 3 0 10 1
(1;1;0;1) 21 4 53 22
(1;1;1;1) 2 2 26 20
Tij =
P
k;l;m;n Tijjklmn 1070 100 1034 230
Table 2: Number of days (Tijjklmn) between Oct 1, 2000 and May 31, 2007 that fall
within each category. The entries can be viewed as the number of Markov transitions
from state klmn to state ij as given in the rows and columns, respectively.Jeliazkov and Poirier 71
Israeli Lags Palestinian Lags
0 1 2
0 -2637.21 -2594.59 -2581.36
1 -2614.34 -2584.37 -2575.23
2 -2608.44 -2585.70 -2585.04
Table 3: Log marginal likelihoods of alternative models for the pooled data October 1,
2000{May 31, 2007. The log marginal likelihood for the best model is in bold.
and persistence. To be cautious, however, we check the eect of this specication on
our results by conducting a sensitivity analysis over three such priors with  klmn = 2
(Jereys' prior, standard deviations equal to :25),  klmn = 4 (uniform prior, standard
deviations equal to :1936), and klmn = 8 (standard deviations equal to :1443). When
considering no-lag, one-lag, and asymmetric lag models, the same Dirichlet priors are
employed for the rows of  (the only dierence being that  will have fewer rows,
depending on the model).
4.2 Stability and Dynamics
The time series analysis here addresses two broad issues: correlation over time and
stability over time. The rst of these is addressed by introducing lags and the second by
allowing for parameter change; both use up degrees of freedom, particularly the second.
Permitting structural change to take place now implies that the data y can be split into
J periods y = (y0
1;:::;y0
J)
0 and in each of these periods the models and parameters can
be dierent. While this increases the complexity of the model that explains y (that
model consists of J sub-models|one for each sub-period), this can potentially result
in more parsimonious models within the sub-periods. A model with many lags is less
likely to favor breaking up the analysis into sub-periods because too many degrees of
freedom are lost. Our results are consistent with these broad conclusions.
We take klmn = 4 (uniform prior) as our reference point and look at  klmn = 2
as a loosening and klmn = 8 as a tightening. This implicitly corresponds to \halving"
or \doubling" the imaginary sample size used to construct the prior. In the following
results, the dierences between log marginal likelihoods are sucient to overwhelm any
reasonable choices of prior probabilities on the possible specications. This holds for
both model choice and model averaging of predictive results.
Tables 3 and 4 contain the posterior results corresponding to klmn = 4. To allow
for possible structural change, these tables present results for the Second Intifada as a
whole, as well as the sub-periods determined by changes in leadership for both Israelis
and Palestinians given in Table 1. As discussed in Section 2.1, to get the marginal
likelihood of the structural change model for the entire period, one has to sum the log-
marginal likelihoods for the sub-periods. The corresponding results for  klmn = 2 and
klmn = 8 are consistent with the results in Table 3 and are available upon request.72 Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada Violence
Israeli Lags Palestinian Lags
0 1 2 0 1 2
Subsample 1 Subsample 2
0 -158.83 -159.15 -160.43 -480.93 -485.54 -486.93
1 -159.36 -160.79 -163.47 -485.58 -492.66 -497.26
2 -163.35 -165.83 -169.61 -488.61 -494.59 -499.10
Subsample 3 Subsample 4
0 -59.63 -60.59 -62.20 -491.76 -496.28 -504.45
1 -62.73 -64.01 -65.24 -495.22 -501.83 -509.96
2 -65.86 -67.54 -68.53 -501.55 -509.02 -520.90
Subsample 5 Subsample 6
0 -508.91 -513.67 -519.29 -364.71 -359.25 -365.82
1 -512.13 -519.18 -525.48 -358.74 -356.01 -365.24
2 -517.15 -527.26 -537.00 -359.75 -361.36 -369.17
Subsample 7 Subsample 8
0 -158.63 -162.82 -171.74 -33.27 -34.97 -38.35
1 -161.05 -166.03 -174.87 -34.51 -36.32 -39.63
2 -163.80 -168.86 -178.11 -35.67 -37.57 -40.78
Subsample 9 Subsample 10
0 -93.46 -96.28 -101.27 -134.59 -136.20 -144.03
1 -96.03 -98.64 -103.04 -137.15 -138.93 -146.86
2 -98.46 -101.74 -106.44 -139.69 -141.62 -149.54
Table 4: Log marginal likelihoods of alternative models in each sub-period (the log
marginal likelihood for the best model in each sub-period is in bold).
From Table 3 it is seen that the largest log marginal likelihood for the pooled sample
corresponds to a specication with asymmetric dynamics. In particular, the preferred
model is one where two Palestinian and one Israeli lags determine the conditional prob-
ability of violence.
However, Table 4 shows that once the analysis considers the potential for hetero-
geneity among the various political regimes listed in Table 1, the data overwhelmingly
favor more parsimonious specications within the sub-periods. Indeed, splitting the
sample according to the main political events during the course of the Second Intifada
is important not only for testing dynamic stability, but also sheds light on the hypoth-
esis that major political changes lead to distinct violence patterns across periods. In
the sub-samples, the most preferred specication is the no-lag (simple multinomial)
specication, except for the one-lag specication for sub-period 6 (Nov 12, 2004{Jan 4,
2006) between Arafat's death and Sharon's second stroke. In particular, summing the
log-marginal likelihoods for the best model in each sub-period from Table 4, one obtains
a value of  2476:02 which is much higher than the value of  2575:23 for the best pooled
data model in Table 3 (even if one were to restrict attention to simple multinomial mod-
els within each sub-period and ignore the rst order dependence in sub-period 6, theJeliazkov and Poirier 73
marginal likelihood of the structural change model would still be  2484:72, again higher
than that for the best pooled data model). Hence, the data strongly favor structural
change versus pooling.
We emphasize that in this analysis we do not attempt to relate priors or parameters
from one period to the next. This is because each period begins with a signicant
political event (e.g. change of government) or the initiation of military activity (e.g.
\Defensive Shield", the Lebanon War), so that little continuity can be expected. The
data and the results in Tables 3 and 4 indeed conrm that these politically distinct
periods also translate into dissimilar periods of Intifada violence. Those particular
inter-period dierences are discussed in the next section.
4.3 Posterior Results and Prediction
The posterior means for each sub-period, which are also the one-step ahead predictive
mass functions, are given in Table 5 for the klmn = 4 prior. The table contains the
full set of transition probabilities for the bivariate process for yt = (It;Pt). The entries
indicate that for periods 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9, the outcome yt = (0;1) has the highest
probability, while for periods 7 and 10 the most probable outcome is yt = (0;0) (in
period 2, these two outcomes appear equiprobable). The posterior probability estimates
during the time of extreme violence (period 3 between March 1, 2002 and April 30, 2002)
indicate that the outcome yt = (1;1) is most likely; the severity of that episode is also
reected in the fact that the probability that no one dies on a given day is less than 5%.
For period 6, which is the only period characterized by rst-order dynamics, the
entries in Table 5 are consistent with retaliation dynamics and temporal persistence.
This can be seen by considering pairs of entries ijjkl for certain i, j, k, or l. For
example, an interesting question to address is whether an Israeli fatality at time t  
1 increases the probability of a Palestinian death at time t. The fact that 01j10 =
0:5625 > 01j00 = 0:1922 and 01j11 = 0:4737 > 01j01 = 0:3950, 11j10 = 0:1250 >
11j00 = 0:0285 and 11j11 = 0:2105 > 11j01 = 0:0504, does indeed indicate an increased
likelihood of Israeli action after a day with Israeli fatalities relative to one without.
These eects are relatively large in size. The evidence on Palestinian retaliation is
mixed since 11j01 = 0:0504 > 11j00 = 0:0285, 11j11 = 0:2105 > 11j10 = 0:1250, and
10j01 = 0:0336 > 10j00 = 0:0320, but 10j11 = 0:0526 < 10j10 = 0:1250; the eects are
also weaker since the dierences are smaller than in the Israeli case. Turning attention
to persistence, the estimates suggest that Palestinian behavior is persistent (i.e. there
is a higher probability of an Israeli death at time t given there was an Israeli fatality
at time t   1), since 11j10 = 0:1250 > 11j00 = 0:0285, 11j11 = 0:2105 > 11j01 =
0:0504, 10j10 = 0:1250 > 10j00 = 0:0320, and 10j11 = 0:0526 > 10j01 = 0:0336. On
the other hand, the evidence of persistence in Israeli behavior (Palestinian deaths) is
mixed: 01j01 = 0:3950 > 01j00 = 0:1922, 11j11 = 0:2105 > 11j10 = 0:1250, and
11j01 = 0:0504 > 11j00 = 0:0285, but 01j11 = 0:4737 < 01j10 = 0:5625. Finally,
the steady-state (invariant) distribution of the Markov process for period 6 is given by
(0:6460;0:0368;0:2736;0:0437).74 Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada Violence
yt = (It;Pt)
Sub-period Lags (0;0) (1;0) (0;1) (1;1)
1. Oct 1, 2000{Feb 6, 2001 none .2857 .0677 .4737 .1729
2. Feb 7, 2001{Feb 28, 2002 none .3836 .0844 .3836 .1483
3. Mar 1, 2002{Apr 30, 2002 none .0462 .0308 .4000 .5231
4. May 1, 2002{Jun 30, 2003 none .2721 .0628 .5256 .1395
5. Jul 1, 2003{Nov 11, 2004 none .3988 .0317 .5000 .0694
6. Nov 12, 2004{Jan 4, 2006 yt 1 = (0;0) .7473 .0320 .1922 .0285
yt 1 = (1;0) .2500 .1250 .5625 .0625
yt 1 = (0;1) .5210 .0336 .3950 .0504
yt 1 = (1;1) .2632 .0526 .4737 .2105
7. Jan 5, 2006{Jul 11, 2006 none .5677 .0156 .3958 .0208
8. Jul 12, 2006{Aug 14, 2006 none .2895 .0263 .6053 .0789
9. Aug 15, 2006{Nov 25, 2006 none .3364 .0187 .5981 .0467
10. Nov 25, 2006{May 31, 2007 none .7173 .0209 .2513 .0105
Table 5: Posterior means (equivalent to one-step predictive probabilities) for yt =
(It;Pt)) corresponding to ijjklmn = 4 for the preferred specication in each sub-period.
In sub-periods 1-5 and 7-10 the best models are static, and in sub-period 6 the best
model contains one Israeli and one Palestinian lag, resulting in 4 possible initial states.
From Table 5 one can also obtain various additional quantities of interest. Two
such quantities are the marginal probabilities of violence for each side, Pr(It = 1j) and
Pr(Pt = 1j), which are obtained by simply summing the columns in the Table where the
corresponding violence indicator equals one. These within-period probabilities are given
in Figure 2, and show the substantial variability among sub-periods. The probabilities
are constant for periods 1-5 and 7-10, but depend on the outcomes in the preceding day
during period 6, which is characterized by one-lag dynamics.
We mention that in a dynamic setting one can use this approach to produce extended
(several-day-ahead) forecasts in a straightforward way when such forecasts are of inter-
est, and that the long-run equilibrium forecast is given by the steady-state distribution
of the Markov process (as reported above for period 6). An example of such multi-day
forecasts is given in Figure 3, which shows the expected evolution of the probabilities
of violence on each side under the four possible starting conditions for the rst-order
process in period 6. One message from the gure is that it does not take long for the
process to converge to its steady-state values. Another message, seen by comparing the
eects of violent days (y0 = (1;1)) or mixed days (y0 = (0;1) or y0 = (1;0)) to those of
peaceful days (yt = (0;0)), is that violence on either side raises the prospects of violence
for both Israelis and Palestinians in the days that follow.Jeliazkov and Poirier 75
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Figure 2: Posterior probability of violence on each side during the Intifada sub-periods.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed data on the occurrence of violence in the Second Intifada us-
ing up-to-date data series from the conict. The modelling framework adopted here
requires very little in terms of modelling structure, and hence provides general descrip-
tive characteristics of the dynamics and structural stability of the process. Our results
indicate that the data are characterized by weak dynamics and strong instability across
sub-periods, showing distinct violence patterns within each political regime. Consider-
ing the period October 1, 2000 { May 31, 2007 as the collection of separate political
sub-periods in Table 1, we nd robust evidence of distinct multinomial models over nine
of these sub-periods, and a rst-order Markov model for sub-period 6. One implication
of this nding is that a fundamental and credible policy change would appear to oer
the best prospects for peace, and that the dynamics of retaliation and persistence should
not be a major impediment in achieving this goal.
The results of this paper provide ample motivation for further research into the
nature of the conict and its dynamics and stability. One avenue for research would
be to use recent advances in the estimation of more sophisticated hierarchical models
to attempt to capture the evolution of the probabilities through dynamic latent pro-
cesses (e.g. Cargnoni et al. 1997; Sung et al. 2007) or through penalties for changes in
the probabilities across periods (Gustafson and Walker 2003). Yet another avenue for
research is to consider additional aspects of the conict such as data on the intensity
of violence, rather than just its occurrence. As a step in this direction, an on-going
analysis of the daily death counts is discussed in Jeliazkov and Poirier (2005), where for76 Dynamic and Structural Features of Intifada Violence
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Figure 3: Extended forecasts of the probability of violence for period 6 of the Intifada.
each side in the conict we rst model the occurrence of violence and then, conditionally
on its occurrence, we postulate a model for the number of casualties.
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